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I. Introduction
  JUSTICE Scalia is an outspoken conservative acclaimed for his remarkable intellect 
and scholarship, and is noted for his adherence to the principle of judicial 
restraint. He pursues what he insists is an "originalist" path that relies on the 
Constitution's actual text in decision-making. He works hard to try to maintain 
constitutional interpretation that does not change from case to case.
  Scalia is concerned that Congress writes imprecise legislation and then leaves its 
interpretation and application in the hands of administrative agencies and 
bureaucrats. Scalia supports a strong federal government. He has been an outspoken 
opponent of affirmative action or preferential treatment to correct past 
discrimination. Scalia is a minority voice on the Court in rejecting a 
constitutional basis for abortion, and sees no constitutional barrier to the death 
penalty. His reading of the First Amendment generally benefits those political 
interests he supports such as abortion protesters and prayer at public school 
graduations. On these issues he often casts a dissenting vote.
  Scalia has said that "the Constitution is an enduring document but not a  'living' 
one, and "its meaning must be protected and not repeatedly altered to suit the whims 
of society." [FN1] Scalia states that an originalist or a textualist takes meaning 
from the Constitution "from its text, and that meaning does not change." [FN2] The 
text itself should be augmented only by examining what the Framers of the 
Constitution intended at the time, not by what a majority in society today might 
prefer. Scalia believes that his approach is the only way we can preserve the 
Constitution's guiding principles. Judges who do not adopt an originalist or 
"textualist" approach, according to Scalia, have no judicial philosophy and issue 
rulings based on the majority view of society at the time. He believes that the 
answer for advocates of controversial issues is to gather enough support from the 
public and pass laws, rather than to have the Supreme Court Justices continually 
revise their views of the Constitution in order to satisfy society.
  So what happens when an "originalist"-concerned that Congress writes imprecise
legislation and then leaves its interpretation and application in the hands of 
administrative agencies or, worse yet, the courts-is forced to deal with tax issues? 
This article takes a look at whether Scalia has been successful in trying to 
construct a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation that does not change 
from case to case, when those cases involve tax issues.
*510 II. By the Numbers: Which Justice Do You Want Writing the Opinion?
  Since being seated on the Court, Justice Scalia has authored an opinion in fifty 
tax cases. Of those fifty, the taxpayers [FN3] won twenty-one. Justice Scalia would 
have had the taxpayer win in 20.5 of those cases. [FN4] The Justices' statistics are
set forth in the chart below.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE  
  Some of the cases involved negative Commerce Clause challenges, which means that a 
taxpayer other than the one to whom the law applied was treated as the taxpayer. 
Such a victory would mean that some taxpayers would lose a tax benefit because it 
was determined to be an unconstitutional restraint of free trade (i.e., an unfair 
benefit for the home team). Viewing taxpayer victories as an inclination for lower 
taxes or loopholes would be incorrect. It may reflect Justice Scalia's vocal 
disapproval of the negative Commerce Clause.
*511 What may be more revealing, however, is to examine the "pure" tax cases-those 
cases dealing with interpretation of the tax statutes. Here we see that Justice 
Scalia is near the bottom in taxpayer victories, [FN5] joined by Rehnquist, but not 
by Thomas. [FN6]
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE  
III. The Tax Cases
  The tax cases are divided into a number of "tax related" topics: 
    . Commerce Clause 
    . Compensation Clause (judges' salaries) 
    . "Pure tax" (statutory or treaty interpretation) 
    . Free Exercise/Establishment/Due Process Clauses 
    . Retroactive application of tax decisions 
    . Legislative history
*512 A. The Commerce Clause Tax Cases
  "During the first years of our history as an independent confederation, the 
National Government lacked the power to regulate commerce among the States. Because 
each State was free to adopt measures fostering its own local interests without 
regard to possible prejudice to nonresidents a 'conflict of commercial regulations, 
destructive to the harmony of the States,' ensued." [FN7] One of the objectives in 
the adoption of the Constitution was to keep the commercial intercourse among the 
States free from all invidious and partial restraints. [FN8] Thus, Article I ß  8, 
cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to 
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes."
  The fifteen case opinions authored by Justice Scalia falling in this category all 
involved a challenge to a state's tax scheme. The Constitution would seem to have 
nothing to do with a state's tax scheme, except that the power of Congress to 
regulate commerce among the several states might restrict the power of a state to 
affect interstate commerce through its tax laws. Justice Scalia expressed it this 
way: 
    [Concluding that a state's tax does not facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce] seems to me the most we can demand to certify compliance with the 
"negative Commerce Clause"-which is "negative" not only because it negates state 
regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution. 
Under the real Commerce Clause ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States," U.S. Const., Art. I, ß  8), it is for 
Congress to make the judgment that interstate commerce must be immunized from 
certain sorts of nondiscriminatory state action-a judgment that may embrace (as ours 
ought not) such imponderables as how much "value [is] fairly attributable to 
economic activity within the taxing State," and what constitutes "fair relation 
between a tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State." [FN9]
*513 Our pre-Constitution experience with allowing states to have free reign with 
economic regulations has lead us to believe that it is better to vest this power in 
the federal government, and it is necessary to safeguard commerce against the 
negative effects of state legislation. Justice Scalia would agree in principal, but 
would place definite limits and boundaries upon our ability to govern the states 
actions to only those situations in which a state's tax facially discriminates 
against interstate commerce, and only then should the U.S. Government intervene. 
[FN10]
  The question is, then, "Should the federal courts be deciding cases dealing with 
state tax issues absent some allegation that it interferes with interstate commerce 
and absent some sort of delegation of this authority by Congress?" Because Congress 
has failed to act on its constitutional mandate that it regulate Commerce, the 
Supreme Court has had to "create a 'negative' commerce clause" in order to protect 
the federal interest in interstate commerce. However, since, generally, it is the 
role of the courts to interpret the law, not having a constitutional mandate has put 
them in a terrible predicament of having to create one that they can interpret. 
Although it would create temporary chaos and would require senators (members of 
Congress) to pass legislation specifically against the constituents that voted them 
into office, perhaps the Supreme Court should, in the future, simply declare that 
unless the state statute violates the "express" Commerce Clause, there is no 
constitutional problem, and throw the problem right back into the lap of Congress.
  There is a very negative aspect to cases involving "negative" Commerce Clause 
challenges. Some taxpayers would lose a tax benefit because it was determined to be 
an unconstitutional restraint of free trade. (For example, a freight tax on wheat 
coupled by a rebate on wheat grown in the state of tax.) Sometimes a taxpayer 
challenges an exemption granted to others. If the taxpayer wins, the exemption is 
disallowed and those who benefitted must pay more tax. The winning taxpayer is 
benefitted, if at all, by others having to pay more.
1. A Tax By Any Other Name
  In West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, [FN11] Massachusetts subjected all milk sold by 
retailers to an assessment. Even though most of the milk sold in Massachusetts was 
from out-of-state dairies, all of the assessed funds were remitted back to 
Massachusetts dairies as a subsidy. Although the state argued that a subsidy would 
be valid, and the assessment applied to all milk, not just out-of-state milk, the 
Court declared the combination invalid. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion: 
    There are at least four possible devices that would enable a State to produce 
the economic effect that Massachusetts has produced here: (1) a discriminatory tax 
upon the industry, imposing a higher liability on out-of-state members than on their 
in-state competitors; (2) a tax upon the industry that is nondiscriminatory in its 
assessment, but *514 that has an "exemption" or "credit" for in-state members; (3) a 
nondiscriminatory tax upon the industry, the revenues from which are placed into a 
segregated fund, which fund is disbursed as "rebates" or "subsidies" to in-state 
members of the industry (the situation at issue in this case); and (4) with or 
without nondiscriminatory taxation of the industry, a subsidy for the in-state 
members of the industry, funded from the State's general revenues. The fourth 
methodology, application of a state subsidy from general revenues, is so far removed 
from what we have hitherto held to be unconstitutional, that prohibiting it must be 
regarded as an extension of our negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence and 
therefore, to me, unacceptable. Indeed, in my view our negative-Commerce-Clause 
cases have already approved the use of such subsidies. 
    . . .The only difference between methodology (2) (discriminatory  "exemption" 
from nondiscriminatory tax) and methodology (3) (discriminatory refund of non-
discriminatory tax) is that the money is taken and returned rather than simply left 
with the favored in-state taxpayer in the first place. The difference between (3) 
and (4), on the other hand, is the difference between assisting in-state industry 
through discriminatory taxation and assisting in-state industry by other means. 
    I would therefore allow a State to subsidize its domestic industry so long as it 
does so from nondiscriminatory taxes that go into the State's general revenue fund. 
[FN12]
  There appears to be a loophole here somewhere. It stems from the problem the Court 
faces every time it declares that the goal of the negative Commerce Clause is to 
prevent the States from engaging in protectionism. "The purpose of the negative 
Commerce Clause, we have often said, is to create a national market. It does not 
follow from that, however, and we have never held, that every state law which 
obstructs a national market violates the Commerce Clause." [FN13]
  Which laws do obstruct a national market is, of course, the important answer. 
Justice Scalia's point is that on stare decisis grounds, we have to live with the 
negative Commerce Clause. However, on equally starry grounds, we also have to live 
with cases such as Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., [FN14] which held that in some 
cases, discriminatory benefits to a state's residents may be justified.
  Justice Scalia's lines seem to be a bit blurry. If the economic impact of his four 
methods of accomplishing Massachusetts' goal are the same, do we care which method 
we adopt? If we do care, we elevate form over substance. [FN15] His rationale seems 
to forget that this was a two-tiered approach: 
    Perhaps, as some commentators contend, that line comports with an important 
economic reality: A State is less likely to maintain a subsidy when its citizens 
perceive that the money (in the general fund) is available for any number of 
competing, *515 nonprotectionist, purposes. I draw the line where I do because it is 
a clear, rational line at the limits of our extant negative-Commerce-Clause 
jurisprudence. [FN16]
  So, while it may seem like Justice Scalia has created a loop hole, if you have an 
inadequate general fund with legislators fighting over social programs, salaries, 
mass transit, education, police and fire, and if you get a subsidy for milk 
producers out of this limited fund, perhaps it was deserved. At least, it will be 
the result of serious reflection and the determination by the state that of its many 
needs, this one was critical to the state's well-being.
  Thus, Massachusetts could pass two independent laws. The first law (in time and 
importance) would be a subsidy, in all cases, in favor of the state dairy farmers. 
The second law, hidden away somewhere in the tax code, would be a nondiscriminatory 
milk tax, on all milk. Revenues from the milk tax should be paid directly to the 
state's general fund. The evil, in West Lynn Creamery was that the revenue from the 
tax directly funded the subsidy instead of going into the general fund where it 
would be available for numerous activities.
  Maybe a little negativity is not a bad thing.
  Which again raises the question posed implicitly by Justice Scalia's anti-negative 
Commerce Clause opinions. Since the clause applies to Congress, what would be the 
harm in letting them handle these problems?
2. The Negative-Negative Commerce Clause
  Strangely enough, the Court recognizes that some discriminatory treatment of local 
commerce is permissible without violating the Commerce Clause. In Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, [FN17] the Court held: 
    The Town argues that its discriminatory tax exemption is, in economic reality, 
no different from a discriminatory subsidy of those charities that cater principally 
to local needs. Noting our statement in West Lynn Creamery that "[a] pure subsidy 
funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, 
but merely assists local business," the Town submits that since a discriminatory 
subsidy may be permissible, a discriminatory exemption must be, too. We have "never 
squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies," and we need not address 
these questions today. Assuming, arguendo, that the Town is correct that a direct 
subsidy benefitting only those nonprofits serving principally Maine residents would 
be permissible, our cases do not sanction a tax exemption serving similar ends. 
[FN18]
  The town's argument was that this exemption for charities was equivalent to a 
subsidy, which the Court has held may sometimes be constitutional. 
*516 We recognized long ago that a tax exemption can be viewed as a form of 
government spending. The distinction we have drawn for dormant Commerce Clause 
purposes does not turn on this point. [FN19]
  In demonstrating that subsidies and exemptions are different, the Court digressed 
into an analysis of Establishment Clause cases. These cases hold that government's 
subsidy of charities, particularly religious charities, are quite possibly forbidden 
under the Establishment Clause. 
    In Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, notwithstanding our assumption that a 
direct subsidy of religious activity would be invalid, we held that New York's tax 
exemption for church property did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. That holding rested, in part, on the premise that there is a 
constitutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions. [FN20]
  A quick recap might be in order. The Supreme Court found that "[a] pure subsidy 
funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, 
but merely assists local business." [FN21] The same, however, does not hold for a 
tax exemption serving similar ends. A tax exemption can be viewed as a form of 
government spending. [FN22] However, the Supreme Court held that New York's tax 
exemption for church property did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment since it did not establish anything by merely not collecting anything from 
the church. [FN23] That holding rested, in part, on the premise that there is a 
constitutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions. [FN24]
*517 Thus, if Maine wants to benefit its citizens by making it easier for 
charitable organizations, including summer camps, to operate, how does it go about 
doing that? Does it risk offending the Establishment Clause by offering subsidies? 
If so, that would be permissible under West Lynn Creamery. Or does it offer an 
exemption? If so, under Walz, that should be permissible as not constituting 
government sponsorship of charities. Presumably, if the state offers a subsidy, it 
may violate the Establishment Clause, but not the Commerce Clause. On the other 
hand, an exemption skips past the Establishment Clause but implicates the Commerce 
Clause.
  As Justice Scalia points out in his dissenting opinion of Camps Newfound/Owatonna: 
    But the principle involved in our disapproval of Maine's exemption limitation 
has broad application elsewhere. A State will be unable, for example, to exempt 
private schools that serve its citizens from state and local real estate taxes 
unless it exempts as well private schools attended predominantly or entirely by 
students from out of State. A State that provides a tax exemption for real property 
used exclusively for the purpose of feeding the poor must provide an exemption for 
the facilities of an organization devoted exclusively to feeding the poor in another 
country. These results may well be in accord with the parable of the Good Samaritan, 
but they have nothing to do with the Commerce Clause. [FN25]
  As Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined, argues this property tax 
exemption had nothing to do with interstate commerce. [FN26] In fact, it had to do 
with real property that had little chance of moving outside the state of Maine at 
all. [FN27] The majority's contention that this is a burden on interstate commerce 
is an enormous leap of logic. [FN28]
  What is involved is a state's own tax policy in affecting social goals that 
benefit its citizens. [FN29] There are no out-of-state competitors, as in the 
situation where the state of Maine was granting a property tax exemption. [FN30] Any 
entity claiming (or not being able to claim) the exemption would have to own 
property within the state, and would thus be a resident, at least for the purposes 
of this tax. [FN31] 
*518 After all, the Court today relies not on any discrimination against out-of-
state nonprofits, but on the supposed discrimination against nonresident would-be 
recipients of charity (the nonprofits' "customers"); surely those individuals are 
similarly discriminated against in the direct distribution of state benefits. The 
problem, of course, is not limited to municipal employment and free public 
schooling, but extends also to libraries, orphanages, homeless shelters, and refuges 
for battered women. One could hardly explain the constitutionality of a State's 
limiting its provision of these to its own residents on the theory that the State is 
a "market participant." These are traditional governmental functions, far removed 
from commercial activity and utterly unconnected to any genuine private market. 
[FN32]
  This decision results in the invalidation of a negative tax, using the negative 
Commerce Clause plus some negative logic. [FN33] There would not be another 
permissible way to accomplish this same goal, as a direct subsidy could be 
challenged on First Amendment grounds as well.
B. It's All About the Money ...
  The American public enjoys a love/hate relationship with tax laws. On the one 
hand, tax laws are viewed with some suspicion because they are so technically 
drafted as to become arcane in their effort at exactitude. On the other hand, the 
public is willing to pay a large premium to practitioners who can decipher the 
arcane and find loopholes.
  As in other areas, Justice Scalia tends to err on the side of literalism, and for 
tax lawyers, that's a good thing. Transactional lawyers, and in particular, tax 
lawyers, make a living by being able to tell a client that a deal will or will not 
work. Period. "It depends" is not a good answer, nor is it comforting to find mixed 
signals coming from the courts.
  In United States v. Hatter, [FN34] the first of three payroll tax decisions, 
Justice Scalia argued that the term "compensation" as used in the Compensation 
Clause [FN35] includes not only cash paid, but exemptions from tax as well. [FN36]
  Prior to 1981, federal employees were not part of the Medicare or Social Security 
programs, and did not have to pay those payroll taxes. In 1982, Congress changed the 
Medicare law to include federal employees. Therefore, federal judges, and all other 
federal employees began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. [FN37]
  In 1983, Congress changed the Social Security laws, requiring all newly hired 
federal employees to participate in Social Security. Most current federal employees 
(about 96%) were given the option to participate in that program. The remaining *519
4%-including all federal judges-were required to participate, or opt into a separate 
contributory retirement program. [FN38]
  A number of federal judges filed suit, [FN39] claiming the changes violated the 
Compensation Clause. [FN40] The majority, lead by Justice Breyer, began by 
overruling Evans v. Gore, [FN41] a 1920 decision, which held that a federal judge 
sitting before the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment could not be subjected to 
the federal income tax. [FN42] Congress, the Evans Court argued, could not 
indirectly do via a tax what it could not do directly by a salary reduction. [FN43] 
Justice Holmes' dissent argued that the purpose behind the Compensation Clause was 
to protect the independence of the judiciary, and that there is no threat to their 
independence to require them to pay taxes that the rest of the country pays. [FN44]
  The majority turned this into an argument that nondiscriminatory taxes do not 
violate the Compensation Clause. [FN45] Justice Scalia disagreed with that argument: 
    My disagreement with the Court arises from its focus upon the issue of 
discrimination, which turns out to be dispositive with respect to the Medicare tax. 
The Court holds "that the Compensation Clause does not forbid Congress to enact a 
law imposing a nondiscriminatory tax upon judges, whether those judges were 
appointed before or after the tax law in question was enacted or took effect." Since 
"the Medicare tax is just such a nondiscriminatory tax," the Court concludes that 
"application of [that] tax law to federal judges is [c]onstitutional." 
    But we are dealing here with a "Compensation Clause," not a "Discrimination 
Clause." As we have said, "the Constitution makes no exceptions for 
'nondiscriminatory' reductions" in judicial compensation. A reduction in 
compensation is a reduction in compensation, even if all federal employees are 
subjected to the same cut. [FN46]
*520 Justice Scalia then argued that the compensation granted to the judges before 
1982 included an exemption from the Medicare tax, and withdrawing this exemption is 
a diminution of the compensation. [FN47] Later in his opinion, Justice Scalia made 
it clear that the Social Security changes are unconstitutional because of the same 
flaw. 
    On my analysis, it would not matter if every federal employee had been made 
subject to the Social Security tax along with judges, so long as one of the previous 
entitlements of their federal employment had been exemption from that tax. Federal
judges cannot, consistent with the Constitution, have their compensation diminished. 
If this case involved salary cuts to pay for Social Security, rather than taxes to 
pay for Social Security, the irrelevance of whether other federal employees were 
covered by the operative legislation would be clear. [FN48]
  Justice Scalia reasoned that discrimination had nothing to do with the 
Compensation Clause, stating: "I agree with the Court, therefore, that Evans was 
wrongly decided-not, however, because in Evans there was no discrimination, but 
because in Evans the universal application of the tax demonstrated that the 
Government was not reducing the compensation of its judges but was acting as 
sovereign rather than employer, imposing a general tax." [FN49] Thus, the dividing 
line is not whether there was discrimination, but whether Congress was reducing 
compensation as the holder of the purse strings.
 Is there a point at which taxing is equivalent to putting fiscal pressure on the 
judges? Yes. 
    We also agree with Evans insofar as it holds that the Compensation Clause offers 
protections that extend beyond a legislative effort directly to diminish a judge's 
pay, say, by ordering a lower salary. Otherwise a legislature could circumvent even 
the most basic Compensation Clause protection by enacting a discriminatory tax law, 
for example, that precisely but indirectly achieved the forbidden effect. [FN50]
  In United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., the Cleveland Indians baseball 
team agreed to pay back wages to several of its former players. [FN51] Under the 
Treasury Regulations, the team was required to treat those payments as wages in the 
year paid, subjecting them to FICA and FUTA liability. [FN52] The team sued for a 
refund, relying upon precedent in the Sixth Circuit that held the payments should be 
deemed wages for the years in which they should have been paid. [FN53]
  Justice Scalia briefly responded to the majorities' lengthy analysis of what 
Congress meant by the term "wages paid," noting that the payments in question were 
not wages. The players were no longer employed by the team, and even if *521 they 
were, this was an award of damages. It might be made in lieu of wages, but it was 
not, strictly speaking, wages. [FN54]
  The statute did not cover this payment, but the Regulations did. Since the Court 
deferred to a reasonable position of the agency, the government won. [FN55]
  In the third case, Jefferson County v. Acker, several federal judges in Alabama 
were sued for a license tax they failed to pay. [FN56] They removed the suit to 
federal court, claiming that the tax violated the intergovernmental immunity
doctrine. [FN57] While agreeing that the judges should lose, Justice Scalia 
disagreed with the majority's position that removal was proper. [FN58] An officer of 
the federal courts is allowed to remove a suit "for any act under color of office or 
in the performance of his duties." [FN59] Justice Scalia's contention was that the 
suit was for nonpayment of taxes, which was not under color of office nor was it a 
part of the judges' duties. Removal, therefore should have been improper. [FN60]
  For tax lawyers, these three cases show that a technical reading of the exact 
language of statutes or of the Constitution may pay off.
C. Pure Tax Cases-Statutory Interpretation
  In O'Gilvie v. United States, the surviving spouse of a tort victim sought to 
exclude both the compensatory and the punitive portions of the awarded damages. 
[FN61] At the time, ß  104(a)(2) provided an exclusion from income for "any damages 
received on account of personal injuries or sickness." [FN62]
  The majority traced through committee reports and determined that Congress must 
have meant that only compensatory damages were excluded from income. [FN63] Justice 
Scalia, in an opinion that basically said "damages are damages" wrote: 
    So, to trace the Court's reasoning: The statute must exclude punitive damages 
because the Committee Report must have had in mind a 1918 Treasury Decision, whose 
text no more supports exclusion of punitive damages than does the text of the 
statute itself, but which must have meant to exclude punitive damages since it was 
based on the "return-of-capital" theory, though, inconsistently with that theory, it 
did not exclude the much more common category of compensation for lost income. 
Congress supposedly knew all of this, and a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure 
it out by mistrusting the inclusive language of the statute, consulting the 
Committee Report, surmising that the Treasury Decision of 1918 underlay that Report, 
mistrusting the inclusive language of the Treasury Decision, and discerning that 
Treasury could have overlooked lost-income compensatories, but could not have 
overlooked punitives. I think not. The sure and *522 proper guide, it seems to me, 
is the language of the statute, inclusive by nature and doubly inclusive by contrast 
with surrounding provisions. [FN64]
  What about the term "property" then? In United States v. Craft, the IRS assessed 
over $480,000 in unpaid income tax liabilities against Don Craft. [FN65] When he did 
not pay, a federal tax lien attached to "all property and rights to property, 
whether real or personal, belonging to" him. [FN66] At the time Mr. Craft and his 
wife owned a piece of real property in Grand Rapids, Michigan, as tenants by the 
entirety. After notice of the lien was filed, the couple tried to deed the husband's 
interest to the wife. [FN67]
  The Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the 
tenancy by the entirety. [FN68] The wife argued that state law prevented such a lien 
from attaching: "'[L]and held by husband and wife as tenants by entirety is not 
subject to levy under execution on judgment rendered against either husband or wife 
alone."' [FN69] Justice Scalia made a thoughtful point in his dissent: 
    I join Justice Thomas's dissent, which points out (to no relevant response from 
the Court) that a State's decision to treat the marital partnership as a separate 
legal entity, whose property cannot be encumbered by the debts of its individual 
members, is no more novel and no more "artificial" than a State's decision to treat 
the commercial partnership as a separate legal entity, whose property cannot be 
encumbered by the debts of its individual members. 
    I write separately to observe that the Court nullifies (insofar as federal taxes 
are concerned, at least) a form of property ownership that was of particular benefit 
to the stay-at-home spouse or mother. She is overwhelmingly likely to be the 
survivor that obtains title to the unencumbered property; and she (as opposed to her 
business-world husband) is overwhelmingly unlikely to be the source of the 
individual indebtedness against which a tenancy by the entirety protects. It is 
regrettable that the Court has eliminated a large part of this traditional 
protection retained by many States. [FN70]
  Damages may be damages, but apparently property is not always property, according 
to Justice Scalia. While a strict reading of the statute would seem to say that the 
tax lien could attach to anything the husband may have owned, Scalia seems to be 
trying to forge an exception for marital property. His reference to partnership 
property is strained. As the majority pointed out, even if state law allows the 
partnership to own property, the lien would still attach to what the partner did 
own-his partnership interest. Just how that analogy would figure in a marriage is 
unknown. Would Justice Scalia argue that the federal tax lien should attach to the 
marriage itself? Or some type of marital interest? Luckily, we did not end up down 
that road.
*523 In In re Estate of Romani, the taxpayer died owing judgments to both a 
private creditor and the government, but the estate did not have enough money to pay 
both claims. [FN71] Justice Scalia agreed with the decision of the Court that the 
government's claim would take second place to a previously filed state law claim. 
[FN72] At issue was whether a provision, which provided that the government's claim 
would come first, prevailed over the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. [FN73] Congress 
had considered legislation that would have explicitly subordinated the provision, 
but had failed to pass it. [FN74] Justice Scalia took issue with the argument that 
this provided a clue to Congressional intent: 
    I join the opinion of the Court except that portion which takes seriously, and 
thus encourages in the future, an argument that should be laughed out of court. 
    ...First and most obviously, Congress cannot express its will by a failure to 
legislate. The act of refusing to enact a law (if that can be called an act) has 
utterly no legal effect, and thus has utterly no place in a serious discussion of 
the law. The Constitution sets forth the only manner in which the Members of 
Congress have the power to impose their will upon the country: by a bill that passes 
both Houses and is either signed by the President or repassed by a supermajority 
after his veto. 1489 Art. I, ß  7. Everything else the Members of Congress do is 
either prelude or internal organization. Congress can no more express its will by 
not legislating than an individual Member can express his will by not voting. 
    Second, even if Congress could express its will by not legislating, the will of 
a later Congress that a law enacted by an earlier Congress should bear a particular 
meaning is of no effect whatever. The Constitution puts Congress in the business of 
writing new laws, not interpreting old ones. "[L]ater enacted laws do not declare 
the meaning of earlier law." If the enacted intent of a later Congress cannot change 
the meaning of an earlier statute, then it should go without saying that the later 
unenacted intent cannot possibly do so. It should go without saying, and it should 
go without arguing as well. [FN75]
  In tax law, the doctrine of legislative reenactment provides that a regulation may 
obtain the force of law through reenactment of its underlying statute. [FN76] 
However, reenactment without change in relevant statutory language and mere 
congressional inaction are at best unreliable indications of congressional intent to 
adopt an administrative construction of a statute. [FN77] The inference of 
congressional approval is stronger when legislative history contains some indication 
that Congress was *524 aware of and approved the administrative construction. [FN78] 
Obviously, the same should hold true with conflicting statutes.
D. Legislative History
  In United States v. Stuart, the Court was called upon to answer the question of 
whether, when requested by Canadian Tax Authorities, the IRS needed to conduct an 
inquiry into whether the information was being sought for a proper purpose. [FN79] 
The majority held that the treaty in question did not require such an inquiry, but 
then buttressed its decision by further stating that the legislative history 
supported that position. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that this 
was sloppy, and opened possible misunderstandings by lower courts: 
    Of course, no one can be opposed to giving effect to "the intent of the Treaty 
parties." The critical question, however, is whether that is more reliably and 
predictably achieved by a rule of construction which credits, when it is clear, the 
contracting sovereigns' carefully framed and solemnly ratified expression of those 
intentions and expectations, or rather one which sets judges in various 
jurisdictions at large to ignore that clear expression and discern a "genuine" 
contrary intent elsewhere. To ask that question is to answer it. 
    One can readily understand the appeal of making the additional argument that the 
plain language of a treaty (which is conclusive) does indeed effectuate the genuine 
intent as shown elsewhere-just as one can understand the appeal, in statutory cases, 
of pointing out that what the statute provides (which is conclusive) happens to be 
sound social policy. Here the implication is that, had the extrinsic evidence 
contradicted the plain language of the Treaty it would govern. That is indeed what 
we mistakenly said in the earlier case that the Court cites as authority for its 
approach. In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, we stated that "[t]he clear 
import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty 
according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or 
expectations of its signatories.' ...." The authority quoted for that proposition in 
fact does not support it. In Maximov, confronted with an argument appealing to the 
"intent or expectations" of the signatories, we responded that "[t]he immediate and 
compelling answer to this contention is that the language of the Convention itself 
not only fails to support the petitioner's view, but is contrary to it." We then 
continued: "Moreover, it is particularly inappropriate for a court to sanction a 
deviation from the clear import of a solemn treaty when, as here, there is no 
indication that application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious 
meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its 
signatories." The import of the highlighted adverb is, of course, that it would be 
inappropriate to sanction a deviation from clear text even if there were indications 
of contrary intent. Our Sumitomo dictum separated the last clause of this quotation 
from its context to support precisely the opposite of what it said. Regrettably, 
*525 that passage from Sumitomo is already being quoted by lower courts as "[t]he 
general rule in interpreting treaties." [FN80]
  Contrast these strong admonitions against the use of legislative history to divine 
the intent of Congress or the Framers with this tidbit from Justice Scalia: 
    "To be put in jeopardy" does not remotely mean "to be punished," so by its terms 
this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecutions. 
Compare the proposal of the House of Representatives, for which the Senate 
substituted language similar to the current text of the Clause: "No person shall be 
subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial 
for the same offence." The view that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit 
multiple punishments is, as Justice Frankfurter observed, "confirmed by history. For 
legislation providing two sanctions for the same misconduct, enforceable in separate 
proceedings, one a conventional criminal prosecution, and the other a forfeiture 
proceeding or a civil action as upon a debt, was quite common when the Fifth 
Amendment was framed by Congress. It would do violence to proper regard for the 
framers of the Fifth Amendment to assume that they contemporaneously enacted and 
continued to enact legislation that was offensive to the guarantees of the double 
jeopardy clause which they had proposed for ratification." [FN81]
  Apparently, there must be a qualifier to Romani. "Everything else the Members of 
Congress do is either prelude or internal organization," [FN82] unless the term is 
really old, and we don't use it much anymore.
  In Begier v. IRS, the bankruptcy trustee of an airline debtor tried to recover the 
airline's prepetition payments of trust fund taxes to the IRS. [FN83] The Court held 
that the payments of income, FICA, and excise taxes collected from its customers 
were not transfers of "property of the debtor, but were instead transfers of 
property held in trust." [FN84] Scalia agreed with the result, but not the 
reasoning: 
    Representative Edwards, the House floor manager for the bill that enacted the 
Bankruptcy Code, said on the floor that "[t]he courts should permit the use of 
reasonable assumptions" regarding the tracing of tax trust funds. We do not know 
that anyone except the presiding officer was present to hear Representative Edwards. 
Indeed, we do not know for sure that Representative Edwards' words were even uttered 
on the floor rather than inserted into the Congressional Record afterwards. If 
Representative Edwards did speak these words, and if there were others present, they 
must have been surprised to hear him talking about the tracing of 26 U.S.C. ß  7501 
tax trust funds, inasmuch as the bill under consideration did not relate to the 
Internal Revenue Code but the Bankruptcy Code, and contained no provision even 
mentioning *526 trust-fund taxes. Only the Senate bill, and not the House proposal, 
had mentioned trust-fund taxes-and even the former had said nothing whatever about 
the tracing of tax trust funds. Only the Senate Committee Report on the unenacted 
provision of the Senate bill had discussed that subject. 
    Nonetheless, on the basis of Representative Edwards' statement, today's opinion 
concludes that "[t]he courts are directed" (presumably it means directed by the 
entire Congress, and not just Representative Edwards) "to apply 'reasonable 
assumptions' to govern the tracing of funds." I do not agree. Congress conveys its 
directions in the Statutes at Large, not in excerpts from the Congressional Record, 
much less in excerpts from the Congressional Record that do not clarify the text of 
any pending legislative proposal. [FN85]
  Maybe it is the fact that Justice Scalia has to keep researching the legislative 
history that makes him so against it.
E. Literal Interpretation
  In another interpretive case, United States v. Burke, the Court had occasion to 
revisit the definition of the Code's [FN86] personal injury award exclusion. [FN87] 
The majority adopted the Treasury Regulation's formulation, that in addition to 
being received on account of personal physical injuries, the damages must also be 
received on account of "tort or tort type rights." [FN88] Justice Scalia correctly 
noted that nowhere in the statute did Congress place the words "tort or tort type 
rights." 
    The Court accepts at the outset of its analysis the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) regulation (dating from 1960) that identifies "personal injuries" under this 
exclusion with the violation of, generically, "tort or tort type rights,"-thus 
extending the coverage of the provision to "'dignitary' or nonphysical tort[s] such 
as defamation." Thereafter, the opinion simply considers the criterion for 
determining whether "tort or tort type rights" are at stake, the issue on which it 
disagrees with the dissent. 
    In my view there is no basis for accepting, without qualification, the IRS' 
"tort rights" formulation, since it is not within the range of reasonable 
interpretation of the statutory text. 
    In deciding whether the words go beyond their more narrow and more normal 
meaning here, the critical factor, in my view, is the fact that "personal injuries" 
appears not in isolation but as part of the phrase "personal injuries or sickness." 
As the Court has said repeatedly, "[t]he maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is 
known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely 
applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of 
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." The term "sickness" connotes a 
"[d]iseased condition; illness; [or] ill health," and I think that its companion 
must similarly be read to connote injuries to physical (or mental) health. It is 
almost as odd to believe that the first part of the phrase *527 "personal injuries 
or sickness" encompasses defamation, as it would be to believe that the first part 
of the phrase "five feet, two inches" refers to pedal extremities. [FN89]
  In Cheek v. United States, Cheek was convicted on six counts of failing to file a 
return and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his tax. [FN90] He admitted 
that he had not filed his returns, but testified that he had not acted willfully 
because he sincerely believed, based on his indoctrination by a tax evasion group 
and his own study, that the tax laws were unconstitutional and that his actions were 
lawful. [FN91] The trial court stated that "an honest but unreasonable belief is not 
a defense and does not negate willfulness." [FN92]
  The majority of the Supreme Court held that a good-faith belief that one is not 
violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the belief is reasonable. 
[FN93] Justice Scalia wrote: 
    [I]t seems to me impossible to say that the word [willful] refers to 
consciousness that some legal text exists, without consciousness that that legal 
text is binding, i.e., with the good-faith belief that it is not a valid law. [FN94]
  Our legislative history indicates that we are ruled by law. However, when there is 
silence in the statute, we are ruled by what the inference is. One could have 
inferred that we should carry the "ruled by law" argument to its conclusion. 
However, the justices stopped short and took a literal reading that willfulness 
requires a conscious belief that the particular legal rule existed and that it was 
valid. This "good-faith" belief opens the door to numerous future tax protest 
challenges.
  In the McDermott's case, the law never spoke on the issue of after-acquired 
property where competing liens were in place. [FN95] The Court argued that the 
"intent" of the statute was that the government would win, but since Congress did 
not address this question, this was putting words in their mouths.
  Since Congress has not spoken, it would appear that there is no "law" by which we 
can be governed. Is this then a function of the Court? To patch the law together 
into a makeshift quilt, at least until Congress fashions a new piece of cloth?
  Of course, interpretation may be in the eye of the beholder; Justice Scalia's 
brand of textualism tries to walk a very straight and conservative line. [FN96] 
According to *528 Justice Scalia, "I trust that in our search for a neutral and 
rational interpretive methodology we have now come to rest, so that the symbol of 
our profession may remain the scales, not the seesaw." [FN97]
F. Religion and Tax Cases
  In three of the tax cases, the Court entertained challenges to exemptions from 
generally applicable state taxes. [FN98] In all three cases Justice Scalia 
dissented, stating that the tax exemptions granted to the religious groups were at 
least allowed by the Constitution, if not required. [FN99]
  In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, the state imposed a general 4% 
sales tax on sales of tangible personal property, but exempted religious, 
professional, trade and sports journals printed in the state. [FN100] The majority 
subjected the tax to strict scrutiny, under the Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue decision. [FN101]
  The problem here is that the Arkansas statute was a generally applicable statute. 
It had a purpose for assisting small scale publications (the religious, sports and 
professional journals) that would survive ordinary scrutiny. [FN102] The problem was 
that there were no more than three journals published in Arkansas that did not meet 
those requirements, and so those three journals were the only ones to pay the tax. 
[FN103] The majority felt that this was singling out the press because of its 
content, and invalidated the tax scheme. [FN104]
  On the other hand, Justice Scalia felt the Court did not provide a workable 
framework for future cases. 
    The reason that denial of participation in a tax exemption or other subsidy 
scheme does not necessarily "infringe" a fundamental right is that-unlike direct 
restriction or prohibition-such a denial does not, as a general rule, have any 
significant coercive effect. It may, of course, be manipulated so as to do so, in 
which case the courts will *529 be available to provide relief. But that is not 
remotely the case here. It is implausible that the 4% sales tax, generally 
applicable to all sales in the State with the few enumerated exceptions, was meant 
to inhibit, or had the effect of inhibiting, this appellant's publication. 
    [T]he majority casts doubt upon a wide variety of tax preferences and subsidies 
that draw distinctions based upon subject matter. The United States Postal Service, 
for example, grants a special bulk rate to written material disseminated by certain 
nonprofit organizations-religious, educational, scientific, philanthropic, 
agricultural, labor, veterans', and fraternal organizations. Must this preference be 
justified by a "compelling governmental need" because a nonprofit organization 
devoted to some other purpose-dissemination of information about boxing, for 
example-does not receive the special rate? The Kennedy Center, which is subsidized 
by the Federal Government in the amount of up to $23 million per year, see 20 U.S.C. 
ß  76n(a), is authorized by statute to "present classical and contemporary music, 
opera, drama, dance, and poetry." ß  76j. Is this subsidy subject to strict scrutiny 
because other kinds of expressive activity, such as learned lectures and political 
speeches, are excluded? Are government research grant programs or the funding 
activities of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, see 47 U.S.C. ß  396(g)(2), 
subject to strict scrutiny because they provide money for the study or exposition of 
some subjects but not others? [FN105]
  In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the publisher of a general interest magazine 
paid under protest a Texas sales tax that exempted "[p]eriodicals published or 
distributed by a religious faith consist[ing] wholly of writings promulgating the 
teachings of the faith and books consist[ing] wholly of writings sacred to a 
religious faith." [FN106] The publisher then sued to recover its payments in state 
court. [FN107]
  The plurality, lead by Justice Brennan, urged a tax expenditure model upon the 
Court: 
    Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, 
forcing them to become "indirect and vicarious 'donors."' Insofar as that subsidy is 
conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious 
organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious 
groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and 
primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause. [FN108]
  Justice Blackmun recognized: 
    I find it more difficult to reconcile in this case the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause values. The Free Exercise Clause suggests that a special 
exemption for religious books is required. The Establishment Clause suggests that a 
special exemption for *530 religious books is forbidden. This tension between 
mandated and prohibited religious exemptions is well recognized. Of course, 
identifying the problem does not resolve it. 
    To recognize this possible reconciliation of the competing First Amendment 
considerations is one thing; to impose it upon a State as its only legislative 
choice is something else. Justice Scalia rightly points out, that the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses often appear like Scylla and Charybdis, leaving a State 
little room to maneuver between them. The Press Clause adds yet a third hazard to a 
State's safe passage through the legislative waters concerning the taxation of books 
and journals. We in the Judiciary must be wary of interpreting these three 
constitutional Clauses in a manner that negates the legislative role altogether. 
[FN109]
  Justice Blackmun contended that the Texas statute did violate the Establishment 
Clause, but left the difficult question of when the Free Exercise Clause requires a 
religious exemption for another day. [FN110]
  After asserting that the Free Exercise Clause requires government to make some 
religion-specific exceptions to generally applicable laws, [FN111] he asserts that 
if a sales tax exemption is not, in fact, required under the Free Exercise Clause, 
it is so far removed from entanglement under the Establishment Clause that it should 
not be invalid. [FN112] 
    Quite obviously, a sales tax exemption aids religion, since it makes it less 
costly for religions to disseminate their beliefs. But that has never been enough to 
strike down an enactment under the Establishment Clause. "A law is not 
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is 
their very purpose." To be sure, we have set our face against the subsidizing of 
religion-and in other contexts we have suggested that tax exemptions and subsidies 
are equivalent. We have not treated them as equivalent, however, in the 
Establishment Clause context, and with good reason. "In the case of direct subsidy, 
the state forcibly divertsthe income of both believers and nonbelievers to churches. 
In the case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from diverting to its own 
uses income independently generated by the churches through voluntary 
contributions." In Walz we pointed out that the primary effect of a tax exemption 
was not to sponsor religious activity but to "restric[t] the fiscal relationship 
between church and state" and to "complement and reinforce the desired separation 
insulating each from the other." [FN113]
  The third case, Camps, was discussed earlier in this article. [FN114] What these 
three cases reveal is that at least a plurality of the Court will draw very narrow 
bounds around any tax exemptions for religious purposes. In fact, Justice Blackmun 
saw *531 only the tip of the iceberg. Not only must the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses be reconciled (with these opinions hinting that Establishment 
takes precedence), but the Press Clause, the Commerce Clause, and perhaps others 
must be weighed in the balance. To be considered valid, the exemption must include a 
number of other, nonreligious charities in its purview, and according to Camps 
Newfound, must not be tailored to impact the interstate flow of commerce. That 
indeed is a tall order.
  Justice Scalia's omens of doom may actually be right on the money. Subsidies are 
out of the question, and religion-specific exemptions seem to fall very easily. 
Proponents of the Office of Faith-Based Action and private school vouchers should 
take note.
G. Retroactivity
  Generally speaking, since a court decides what the law is, for tax cases, the 
decisions apply retroactively back to the enactment of the tax. [FN115] That rule, 
however, can work some interesting havoc.
  In United States v. Carlton, the executor took a rather aggressive position and 
claimed a loss for stock he bought after the decedent's death, but sold to an 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) before filing of the estate tax return. [FN116] 
A year later, Congress amended the statute to provide that the stock must be held by 
the decedent prior to death. [FN117] This change was to be applied retroactively. 
[FN118] The majority held the amendment to be a curative measure, and the estate 
lost. [FN119] Justice Scalia disagreed. 
    If I thought that "substantive due process" were a constitutional right rather 
than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-and-switch taxation. Although 
there is not much precision in the concept "'harsh and oppressive,"' which is what 
the Court has adopted as its test of substantive due process unconstitutionality in 
the field of retroactive tax legislation, surely it would cover a retroactive 
amendment that cost a taxpayer who relied on the original statute's clear meaning 
over $600,000. [FN120]
Since the majority's opinion relied upon substantive Due Process grounds, Scalia 
compared this case to other substantive Due Process cases, in which governmental 
regulation (and especially retroactive regulation) is routinely struck down. [FN121] 
It does seem odd that since property rights are explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, that they would be given lesser status than other substantive Due 
Process rights: 
*532 The picking and choosing among various rights to be accorded  "substantive 
due process" protection is alone enough to arouse suspicion; but the categorical and 
inexplicable exclusion of so-called "economic rights" (even though the Due Process 
Clause explicitly applies to "property") unquestionably involves policymaking rather 
than neutral legal analysis. I would follow the text of the Constitution, which sets 
forth certain substantive rights that cannot be taken away, and adds, beyond that, a 
right to due process when life, liberty, or property is to be taken away. [FN122]
  In Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, the state of Virginia, following the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 
[FN123] amended its statute which taxed the retirement benefits paid by the Federal 
government but exempted similar benefits paid by the state. [FN124] A group of 
federal retirees sued for refunds of state taxes they paid prior to the amendment. 
[FN125] The Court held for the retirees. [FN126]
  Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, cataloguing the jurisprudence of 
retroactivity and stare decisis. 
    What most provokes comment in the dissent, however, is not its insistence that 
today a rigid doctrine of stare decisis forbids tinkering with retroactivity, which 
four Terms ago did not; but rather the irony of its invoking stare decisis in 
defense of prospective decisionmaking at all. Prospective decisionmaking is the 
handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. It was 
formulated in the heyday of legal realism and promoted as a "techniqu[e] of judicial 
lawmaking" in general, and more specifically as a means of making it easier to 
overrule prior precedent. Thus, the dissent is saying, in effect, that stare decisis 
demands the preservation of methods of destroying stare decisis recently invented in 
violation of stare decisis. 
    Contrary to the dissent's assertion that Chevron Oil articulated  "our 
traditional retroactivity analysis," the jurisprudence it reflects "came into 
being," as Justice Harlan observed, less than 30 years ago with Linkletter v. 
Walker. It is so un-ancient that one of the current Members of this Court was 
sitting when it was invented. The true traditional view is that prospective 
decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have 
no authority to engage in the practice. Linkletter itself recognized that "[a]t 
common law there was no authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made
law only for the future." And before Linkletter, the academic proponents of 
prospective judicial decisionmaking acknowledged that their proposal contradicted 
traditional practice. Indeed, the roots of the contrary tradition are so deep that 
Justice Holmes was prepared to hazard the guess that "[j]udicial decisions have had 
retrospective operation for near a thousand years." 
    Justice O'Connor asserts that "'[w]hen the Court changes its mind, the law 
changes with it."' That concept is quite foreign to the American legal and 
constitutional tradition. It would have struck John Marshall as an extraordinary 
assertion of raw *533 power. The conception of the judicial role that he possessed, 
and that was shared by succeeding generations of American judges until very recent 
times, took it to be "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is, "-not what the law shall be. 
    Prospective decisionmaking was known to foe and friend alike as a practical tool 
of judicial activism, born out of disregard for stare decisis. 
    ...Whether cause or effect, there is no doubt that the era which gave birth to 
the prospectivity principle was marked by a newfound disregard for stare decisis. It 
was an era when this Court cast overboard numerous settled decisions, and indeed 
even whole areas of law, with an unceremonious "heave-ho." To argue now that one of 
the jurisprudential tools of judicial activism from that period should be extended 
on grounds of stare decisis can only be described as paradoxical. 
    In sum, I join the opinion of the Court because the doctrine of prospective 
decisionmaking is not in fact protected by our flexible rule of stare decisis; and 
because no friend of stare decisis would want it to be. [FN127]
IV. Conclusion
  Justice Scalia is more than a brilliant, outspoken conservative, he is a staunch 
advocate for literalism and judicial restraint. He is dedicated to relying on the 
Constitution's actual text in decision-making and trying to maintain constitutional 
interpretation that does not change from case to case. In this respect he is an 
advocate for stare decisis.
  Scalia continues to bring to light the problems concerned with Congress' 
imprecisely worded legislation, but refuses to read into the legislation, instead 
preferring to force a statement from Congress. Scalia adheres to his statement that 
"the Constitution('s) meaning must be protected and not repeatedly altered to suit 
the whims of society." [FN128] The Constitution must be interpreted "from its text, 
and that meaning does not change." [FN129]
  Because of his dedication to a literal interpretation of the Constitution, he is 
opposed to interpreting laws by innuendo through legislative history, the lack of a 
statement by Congress or any other act that is not reduced to writing through the 
proper channels. He has made numerous statements illustrating the dangers of such 
"interpretation." He has attempted to make a literal reading of the tax law. This is 
a breath of fresh air for tax attorneys. He has upheld long standing concepts such 
as the legislative reenactment doctrine in the spirit of its previous reading. And 
in the area of religious tax exemptions and subsidies, he has attempted to hold 
tight to the line in definition and neutrality.
  In short, even in the tax area, Justice Scalia has maintained the basic tenets of 
his philosophy on the Court: the law should be literally interpreted and then, only 
from the written word from Congress. What a novel idea. Critics may decry Scalia's 
*534 conservatism in substantive Due Process cases or First Amendment cases, but his 
brand of originalism is welcome news to tax attorneys. The last thing a 
transactional attorney wants is expansionism in terms of filling in where Congress 
left off. What we do like is straight interpretation of terms, leaving to Congress 
the job of fixing their own mistakes.
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